Counting allies from both sides of “the crack”, in the open, simultaneous and mandatory primaries (PASO) of September 12, the Frente de Todos (FDT) touched 32% of the votes vs. 40% of Together for Change ( JXC). The first surveys after the PASO do not show statistically significant differences: the FDT ranges between 31% and almost 30% according to the latest national study by Zuban Córdoba (graphs above and below), while JXC is around 41% (graph below).
Along the same lines, according to the most recent Synopsis survey, the FDT is around 29% (graph below). The main difference between the two studies resides in the fact that according to Zuban Córdoba the vote to punish the ruling party is around 47%, while for Synopsis it is around 66%.
There are also no substantive nuances regarding the retention of the flow obtained in the PASO: 87.2% of those who voted for the FDT say that they will maintain their vote in the November general elections, while almost 94% of those who favored any of the opposing forces say the same thing (graph below). The gap of 6.5 percentage points is not statistically significant at this level, nor is the gap of 3.1 percentage points between those who voted for the opposition and would now favor the FDT and those who would act in the opposite direction.
Deepening the analysis, Management & Fit reports that 75% of voters (that is, 3 out of 4) are not willing to change their vote and inquire into the possibility of changing their vote within each stamp. In this case, JXC takes an advantage of 11.2 percentage points of retention with respect to the FDT (85.3% vs 74.1%, respectively). However, the ruling party could discount part of that gap if it captures part of the vote to the left, since almost 49% of those voters say they are willing to change their vote in November (graph below).
In this framework, the possibilities of more sensitive changes in trends towards November go through the variable electoral participation. According to M&F, 77.2% would vote in the general elections in November (graph below). This implies about 11 percentage points above those who actually participated in the PASO (around 66%) and a potential mass of more than 3 million new voters.
The ruling party clings to a hypothesis: while JXC obtained in the PASO a result similar to its 2017 and 2019 ceilings (around 40%, between 8 and 9 million votes), the FDT would be closer to the floor, for which would have more ground to grow. This hypothesis is fed by some hard data from September 12: the 15 electoral circuits with the lowest participation in the primaries are from the third cordon of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), where in 2019 the FDT took an average advantage of 55 percentage points from JXC , while in 2021 the gap narrowed to 25 points. In the same vein, an analysis of 100 polling stations from schools located in very poor areas of the country allows us to detect that the FDT yielded votes compared to 2019 and also against 2017 (adding the amount of Unidad Ciudadana, massismo and PJ ally). In 2019 he won 86% of those selected tables, while in PASO 2021 he won 51%.
It is true that in the electoral shifts of 2015 and 2019 the opposite happened: between the primaries and the generals, the anti-Peronist and anti-Kirchnerist vote grew more, but on those two occasions the pan-Justicialist space had obtained the first minority, while now the opposite has happened. . If a polarization that tends to avoid hegemony beats in the Argentine electorate and now it could seek a counterweight to the map of yellow predominance of PASO 20121 as in 2019 it sought to balance the blue-tinted map of PASO 2019, then the comeback hypothesis The ruling party would not be unreasonable. What would be the ceiling to which the FDT could climb capitalizing on such an “anti-Change” reaction? One clue is provided by Zuban Córdoba, who figures at almost 44% the “anti macrismo” at the country level (graph below). If the FDT achieves a recovery of that magnitude, the November result would be in the technical tie zone.
Outside of this maximum aspiration, the ruling party has a modest objective: to reduce the gap of 8 percentage points obtained by JXC, recovering a good part of the almost 4.3 million votes lost compared to the 2019 elections in the section of deputies nationals. How much is reasonably recoverable, given the electoral antecedents ?: about 2.5 million votes, which is what the FDT resigned on September 12 with respect to those added in the PASO 2017 Citizen Unity + the massismo + the PJ ally . Along the same lines, I would bet on reversing the defeat of the primaries in some provinces (among them, La Pampa) and reducing the gap in others (Chubut) in order to maintain the current majority in the Senate of the Nation. What would happen, on the other hand, if the final shift in November produces a result similar to that of the STEP?
In that case, the FDT could retain the first minority in the Chamber of Deputies by a minimal difference with respect to JXC (which would maintain its bench, given that it puts more seats at stake than the ruling party), but it would be further from forming a quorum, with the additional complication that the bench of the district forces would weaken in favor of an advance of the right (Avanza Libertad) and the Left Front, which are a priori two forces less inclined to parliamentary negotiation (graph above). In the Senate, the change would be more sensitive, since the decline in the FDT would translate into a symmetrical advance by JXC that would leave the opposition force only one seat from the ruling party in the Upper House.